Master thesis: Robust Mechanism Design

17.08.2023, Abschlussarbeiten, Bachelor- und Masterarbeiten

The traditional approach on mechanism design is to assume that all uncertanity can be modelled by a probabilistic belief, which is common knowledge to all participants. We relax this assumption and look for a mechanism which performs well under ambiguity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguity_effect Literature review on Robust mechanism design: Carroll, G. (2019). Robustness in mechanism design and contracting. Annual Review of Economics, 11, 139-166. Related work: Bayrak, H. I., Koçyiğit, Ç., Kuhn, D., & Pınar, M. C. (2022). Distributionally robust optimal allocation with costly verification. arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.15122. Requirements: - Linear programming (Operations Research) - Auction design (Game Theory) If you are interested, please send an email to halil.bayrak@tum.de stating your skills and interests and also attach a current CV and a recent grade report.

The traditional approach on mechanism design is to assume that all uncertanity can be modelled by a probabilistic belief, which is common knowledge to all participants. We relax this assumption and look for a mechanism which performs well under ambiguity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguity_effect

Literature review on Robust mechanism design: Carroll, G. (2019). Robustness in mechanism design and contracting. Annual Review of Economics, 11, 139-166.

Related work: Bayrak, H. I., Koçyiğit, Ç., Kuhn, D., & Pınar, M. C. (2022). Distributionally robust optimal allocation with costly verification. arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.15122.

Requirements:
- Linear programming (Operations Research)
- Auction design (Game Theory)

If you are interested, please send an email to halil.bayrak@tum.de stating your skills and interests and also attach a current CV and a recent grade report.

Kontakt: halil.bayrak@tum.de