There are two kinds of belief: belief simpliciter - believing that A is the case - and degrees of belief - assigning subjective probabilities to propositions. We prove that given reasonable assumptions, it is possible to give an explicit definition of belief simpliciter in terms of subjective probability, such that it is neither the case that belief is stripped of any of its usual logical properties, nor is it the case that believed propositions are bound to have probability 1. Belief simpliciter is not to be eliminated in favour of degrees of belief, rather, by reducing it to assignments of consistently high degrees of belief, both quantitative and qualitative belief turn out to be governed by one unified theory. Turning to possible applications and extensions of the theory, we suggest that this will allow us to see: how the Bayesian approach in general philosophy of science can be reconciled with the deductive or semantic conception of scientific theories and theory change; how primitive conditional probability functions (Popper functions) arise from conditionalizing absolute probability measures on maximally strong believed propositions with respect to different cautiousness thresholds; how the assertability of conditionals can become an all-or-nothing affair in the face of non-trivial subjective conditional probabilities; and how high conditional chances may become the truthmakers of counterfactuals.